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By George Gedda, Associated Press Writer Fri Oct 11, 1:06 Pm ET.
WASHINGTON (AP) - Weeks after the Soviet Union agreed to pull offensive
missiles from Cuba in 1962, Nikita Khrushchev was worried that an "irrational"
Fidel Castro would renew tensions with the United States, possibly even
provoking a war, newly released documents show.
Cuba "wants practically to drag us behind it with a leash, and wants to
pull us into a war with America by its actions," Khrushchev said in a Nov.
16 letter to diplomatic aides in Cuba.
At issue were U.S. surveillance flights sent over Cuba to monitor
dismantling of the missiles Moscow had installed on the island. Khrushchev, the
Communist leader of the Soviet Union, had agreed in late October to pull out the
missiles as part of a deal with President Kennedy.
But Khrushchev was concerned that Castro would order his forces to shoot
down the low-flying U.S. surveillance flights, which the Cuban leader clearly
saw as an intolerable intrusion on Cuban sovereignty.
The Soviet agreement to pull out the missiles followed a two-week period,
starting in mid-October, in which the two powers came close to a nuclear
exchange.
There was a sense of relief worldwide when the agreement was announced but
the newly released documents demonstrate the crisis did not end on Oct. 29, as
is widely believed.
Khrushchev's concerns were contained in documents being released on the
occasion of the 40th anniversary of the missile crisis.
Cuba is commemorating the event with a two-day conference in Havana that was
starting on Friday.
The documents being released there are from the Cuban government, the CIA,
the Pentagon, the White House, the Soviet Foreign Ministry and other governments
which played a role in the long ago events.
A portion of the documents was made available to The Associated Press in
Washington.
The National
Security Archives, a Washington-based research group, has been cooperating
with the Cuban government in preparing for the conference.
Archive director Thomas Blanton said, "The conference room will echo
with words that resonate today, such as 'intelligence failure,' 'pre-emptive
strike' and 'weapons of mass destruction.'"
The day after Khrushchev sent his memo to Anastas Mikoyan, a top diplomatic
adviser who was monitoring events in Havana, it appeared as though Khrushchev's
worst fears were being realized.
A Cuban military document, stamped "Top Secret," said Cuban
anti-aircraft units were being given authority to open fire against "enemy
aircraft" starting on Nov. 18.
There is no evidence the order was ever carried out. Castro suggests in one
document that the order was countermanded, telling a Russian visitor at a later
date: "Just imagine, our soldiers cried in the trenches, having no
opportunity to shoot at the planes, which were flying at grass-cutting
altitudes.
"That affected their morale negatively," Castro said. "And
one has to take into account that the enemy will be threatening us for a long
time."
Khrushchev clearly felt a sense of betrayal that Cuba was not appreciative
of the deal he negotiated, a key element of which was a U.S. promise not to
invade the island.
He expressed regret that Cuba did not want to take steps to avoid war.
"If our Cuban comrades take steps that in their opinion protect their
interests — that is their right," Khrushchev said.
"But then we have to raise with them the issue that we would be forced
to absolve ourselves of all responsibility for the consequences their steps
might entail for them.
"If they do not take our arguments into account, then it is clear that
our side cannot bear the responsibility for it."
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