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By George Gedda, Associated Press writer. Tue Oct 15, 1:43 PM ET
WASHINGTON - Weeks before the Cuban missile crisis erupted, Fidel Castro's
biggest concern was that his "imperialist" neighbor would somehow
discover the secret Soviet rocket deployments on Cuban soil.
Castro outlined his concerns in a speech he delivered to a Communist Party
conclave in January 1968. Excerpts of the speech, kept secret until now, are
contained in a book by two American professors that coincides with the 40th
anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis.
When Castro dispatched his brother, Raul, to Moscow to raise his concerns
about possible American discovery of the missiles, Raul got the following
response from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev:
"Don't worry. I'm going to grab Kennedy by the testicles and he will
just have to come and talk it over because, after all, they have our country
surrounded by bases, in Turkey, here, there, everywhere."
The United States did, indeed, discover the missiles, and on Oct. 16, 1962
40 years ago Wednesday President Kennedy was informed of them.
Khrushchev's actions in the aftermath did not match the swaggering threat he
had described in his conversation with Raul. After two weeks, he agreed to
withdraw the missiles but not before the two superpowers had come closer
than at any time during the Cold War to nuclear annihilation.
Fidel Castro spoke to the Communist Party's Central Committee for 12 hours
over two days in January 1968. Raul was at his side, and it was he who summed up
Khrushchev's ribald response about how he planned to deal with Kennedy.
The passage is contained in "Sad
and Luminous Days," by James G. Blight of Brown University and Philip
Brenner of American University.
According to the book, Fidel Castro also had these observations about the
crisis:
_ The Soviets showed great "carelessness" in not doing more to
keep the 20-meter-long missiles out of view. "In a country so full of
construction projects, it would have been the easiest thing in the world for us
to build those emplacements under the guise of something totally different and
they never would have been discovered. ... I was amazed that they weren't
discovered earlier."
_ The high-level contacts that Cuba had with the Russians in Moscow were so
secretive that Cuba's official interpreters were barred from the meetings.
_ After three years of U.S. harassment, having missiles available was a
heady feeling for Castro despite the dangers. "We were defending those
rockets with amazing fervor and love. For the first time we were participating
in a certain state of equality with an enemy that had been attacking us and
provoking us incessantly, and we were really enjoying such a new and different
situation."
_ The missiles raised the possibility of Cuba entering into a negotiation
with the United States over their fate, an idea that Castro relished. He
believed the missiles would have given him leverage to reclaim the naval base at
Guantanamo Bay from U.S. control.
_ On Oct. 26, during the darkest hours of the crisis, Castro said in a memo
to Khrushchev: "I believe that aggression is imminent in the next 24 to 72
hours."
Much of the world applauded days later when the crisis ended with
Khrushchev's promise to remove the missiles in exchange for a pledge by Kennedy
not to invade Cuba and to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey, a Soviet neighbor.
But the outcome left Castro inconsolable. He told Khrushchev in a letter: "We
knew do not presume that we did not that we would be exterminated.
... Nonetheless, we did not ask you to withdraw the missiles.
"Do you perhaps believe that we desired that war? But how could it have
been avoided if they had invaded. ... The majority of Cubans are currently
experiencing unspeakable bitterness and sadness. The imperialists have again
begun to speak of invading our country, a demonstration of how short-lived and
untrustworthy their promises are."
Missile
Crisis - Links
Castro
/ Khrushchev Letters
A sad day
for Castro? / Servando Gonzáles
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